tag:www.thestrategist.org,2008://1 2008-01-13T02:49:40Z Movable Type 3.31 tag:www.thestrategist.org,2008://1.56 2008-01-13T02:33:22Z 2008-01-13T02:49:40Z

Issues of strategy can be found in the proliferation of national strategies, of which there are no fewer than twenty addressing various aspects of the War on Terror. These strategies deal with the problems of homeland security, homeland defense, and...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org National Security Strategy of the United States of America and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. ]]> National Security Strategy pre-dated, but broadly paralleled, the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report regarding what the United States should do (employ all the elements of national power) and how it should do it (transform the major institutions of American national security to meet the requirements of the post-9/11 era). (1) The 2006 version of the National Security Strategy reinforces the original tenets from 2002 and lists examples of progress made in the intervening four years. (2) It also reserves the option of preemptive actions to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations with global reach. In this sense, it forms a loose overarching strategy to secure the United States against terrorist attack. It defines America’s enemy as terrorism and terrorist networks in general, but it makes the fundamental strategic error espoused by Tilford, in that it does not clearly identify the enemy, nor national objectives regarding that enemy. (3) In its language, the 2006 National Security Strategy may contribute inadvertently to the motivations of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. It clearly states that, “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture.”(4) In Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, Michael Scheur argues that it is precisely American policies and actions of the past thirty years in Muslim nations, including pressure to conform to democratic principles, that have lead to the War on Terror. American policies and actions “provide Muslims with proof of what bin Laden describes as ‘an ocean of oppression, injustice, slaughter, and plunder carried out by you against our Islamic ummah. It is therefore commanded by our religion that we must fight back. We are defending ourselves against the United States. This is a ‘defensive jihad’ as we want to protect our land and people.’”(5) Scheur supports this argument with public opinion polls in the Muslim world, which indicate an overwhelmingly negative view of the United States. (6) Whether democracy is a clear and obtainable objective in the war on terror is questionable. In Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World, Ralph Peters takes the position that “Democracy must be earned and learned. It cannot be decreed from without. In a grim paradox, our [United States] insistence on instant democracy in shattered states…is our greatest contribution to global instability.”(7) Efforts to impose democracy on other sovereign nations may be perceived by those nations and their cultures as the ultimate example of American hubris. This may be a causal factor in members of other cultures responding to calls for war against the United States. The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security also predated the 9/11 Commission Report. (8) Its stated purpose, “to mobilize and organize the nation to secure the homeland from terrorist attacks,” seemed to be a goal that would be more applicable to the National Security Strategy. (9) Its objectives – preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and response and recovery to terrorist attacks – were focused inward on domestic preparations and constituted a primarily defensive and preventive strategy. It was an example of what Summers describes as taking the strategic defensive, which led to United States defeat in Vietnam. (10) Much of what it prescribed for homeland security also conformed to Clausewitz’s definition of preparations for war instead of the conduct of war proper. It did not provide an objective or a strategy for offensive actions to counter terrorism, to preempt it at United States borders, or for taking the strategic offensive in the War on Terror. It provided a blueprint for the Department of Homeland Security but, despite having a segment devoted to American federalism and homeland security, it did not provide any authority for directing how the various federal agencies should work in synchronization to prosecute the War on Terror. Ultimately, in its call for the implementation of homeland security measures costing hundreds of billions of dollars, it may have served al Qaeda’s strategic objective of bleeding the United States economy as a means of defeating American resolve. (11) Ironically, al Qaeda’s strategic objective is similar to that employed by the United States when it bled the economy of the former Soviet Union into bankruptcy in the Cold War arms race. The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security describes its purpose as “to guide, organize, and unify our Nation’s homeland security efforts.” (12) It acknowledges the need to take measures that enhance the resilience of the national economy and critical infrastructure, and it takes into account the necessity to prepare for catastrophic natural disasters (such as Hurricane Katrina) as well as terrorist attacks. It does prescribe some measures that can be categorized as taking the strategic offensive. However, its approach reinforces an industrial age paradigm by focusing on the land, maritime, air, space, and cyber domains, rather than an information age paradigm focused on the physical (including land, maritime, air, space, and cyber), information, cognitive, and social domains. It does not set objectives for winning the War on Terror. The nature of the War on Terror – against the unknown, the uncertain, and the unexpected, as Rumsfeld indicated – makes strategic thinking difficult. The proliferation of national strategies that partition the war on terror into segments further complicates the effort. An example of how this occurs can be found in Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War, in which Beyerchen includes a discussion of the way chance is associated with Clausewitz’s concept of the fog of uncertainty in war, which obscures or distorts most of the factors on which action is based. (13) According to Beyerchen, chance as a function of analytical blindness, as described by the late 19th century mathematician Henri Poincaré and displayed in Clausewitz’s work, results in an inability to see the universe as an interconnected whole. To paraphrase Beyerchen’s argument and apply it to the War on Terror: The inability to see the War on Terror in its entirety has resulted in multiple national strategies that break it down into segments more easily dealt with. Yet it happens that these segments interact and the effects of this interaction seem to be due to chance. The result is that the effort to comprehend the War on Terror through analysis, the effort to partition off pieces of it to make them individually amenable to strategic thought, creates the possibility of being blindsided by the partitioning process. According to Beyerchen, Clausewitz had a profound sense of how the understanding of phenomena – in this case the War on Terror – is truncated by the bounds placed on it for analytical convenience. Clausewitz stressed the failure of theorists to develop effective principles because they insist on isolating individual factors or aspects of the problems presented in war. Beyerchen quotes Clausewitz to illustrate his point: Efforts were therefore made to equip the conduct of war with principles, rules, or even systems. This did present a positive goal, but people failed to take an adequate account of the endless complexities involved. As we have seen, the conduct of war branches out in all directions and has no definite limits; while any system, any model, has the finite nature of a synthesis….[these attempts] aim at fixed values; but in war everything is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities. They [theorists] direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all military action is entwined with psychological forces and effects. They [theorists] consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of continuous interaction of opposites. (14) This is not to indicate that strategy in the War on Terror is without value; quite the opposite. While strategy as a plan, or product, is problematic (as indicated in the preceding discussion), strategy as process brings great value. Strategy as process brings together often disparate elements to understand and prosecute a war that is in many ways at odds with historical record. The issue for the United States is how it will transform its strategic processes to meet the requirements of warfare in the Information Age. (1) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (2) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf (3) Earl Tilford, “The War on Terror: World War IV,” A Reserve Officers Association National Security Report, Officer (October 2004), 38. (4) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006, 1. (5) Anonymous (Michael Scheur), Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey’s, Inc., 2004), 129. (6) Ibid, 177. (7) Ralph Peters, Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World (Mechanisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002), 179-181. (8) National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_hls.pdf (9) Ibid, 1. (10) Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1984), Ch. 8. (11) Anonymous (Michael Scheur), Imperial Hubris, 100-101. (12) National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002, 1. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeland/nshs/NSHS.pdf (13) Alan D. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security 17, no.3 (winter 1992): 59-90. (14) Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, 134-136.]]> tag:www.thestrategist.org,2007://1.55 2007-12-23T02:39:46Z 2007-12-23T02:51:55Z

The war metaphor invoked by the United States in prosecuting the War on Terror renders its efforts subject to analysis by the doctrinal rules of war. Contemporary United States doctrine for fighting wars derives its foundation – its “rules of...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org On War. (1) Despite being published posthumously after Clausewitz’s death in 1831, On War continues to shape current American military thinking and remains the most modern authority available on the essence of war. Simply put, no one has produced a better description of the essence of war and the immutable principles for its conduct in nearly two centuries. It is considered by many to be the greatest work on war and strategy ever produced by Western civilization, and its key concepts can be used to put current efforts in the War on Terror in perspective.]]> The logic [nature] of war, violence directed by political intent, remains constant but the grammar [character] changes. Logic is a constant regardless of age, sex, ethnicity, nationality or cultural factors. On the other hand, how one addresses a particular problem or issue, the methods used, is subject to a large number of factors such as age, sex, physical condition, resources, culture, religious beliefs and values. Applied to war, there is then a distinctly American way of war that differs significantly from the way Chinese or Russians or Zulus make war. There is also a distinctly Muslim fundamentalist way of making war. Clausewitz’s point is that although nations and groups make war in different ways based on a large number of factors, they go to war for one logical reason only: to force an enemy to do their will. (3) The first concept that Clausewitz offers is his definition of war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”(4) From the vantage point of Clausewitz’s definition the War on Terror is not unique, and it would be a mistake to see it in any way other than strategic context. To begin, Clausewitz’s definition of war can be broken into three elements. They are, first, that the effort is directed toward an identified opponent; second, that it involves violence or use of force to compel our opponent to fulfill our will; and third – implied – that we know our national will. The War on Terror does not present a new problem from Clausewitz’s logical perspective, but merely a modern application of an ancient concept. Second, Clausewitz declared that all wars could be considered acts of policy. Otherwise, the entire effort contradicts the history of war. It is absolutely essential therefore that: The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. (5) To understand the true nature of the War on Terror requires not only a refined definition of the enemy, but also a knowledge and comprehension of the nature of the war itself. For the United States to stray from this principle, again, invites failure. This leads to a third principle established by Clausewitz, that of the political objective. To paraphrase, the political object is the goal, war is the means for reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. (6) Only upon establishment of the objective of the war can strategy be devised to achieve it. Following the logic of Clausewitz if al Qaeda is its most visible enemy in the War on Terror, and perhaps the forerunner of adversary networks in the information age, then the United States must understand the nature of al Qaeda, as well as the nature of its conflict with al Qaeda. It can then develop clearly defined, decisive and attainable objectives with attendant strategy to prevail against al Qaeda. Lack of clarity of strategic objectives, in the long-term, has the potential to lead to a wearing down of American resolve, which ultimately can lead to failure. This is evocative of the lack of clarity of strategic objectives, described very clearly and eloquently by Summers, which contributed to American failure in Vietnam. (7) Clausewitz put forth two additional sets of concepts that offer insight into the War on Terror. They are the concepts of fog and friction, and the concepts of efforts that constitute preparations for war versus war proper. The concept of fog in war refers to the uncertainty of the information that is available to the commander. (8) Uncertainty can make problems seem, outside of perspective, larger than they really are. In the absence of information, that which is not known is left to chance. Friction is the concept that “everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult,” and the difficulties accumulate. (9) Clausewitz envisioned an army as a very simple machine, but with a multitude of moving parts, each of which retains its independent capability to generate friction. Both fog and friction can be observed throughout the United States effort in the War on Terror. The effects of fog can be found in the lack of clarity of information that exists at the policy, strategic, operational, and tactical levels of effort. Friction can be observed in the homeland security related interagency conflicts between international, federal, state, local, tribal, and private agencies. Both fog and friction have impacted the strategic gaps that exist between agencies such as that between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense; in the foreign-domestic divide described by the 9/11 Commission; in the lack of interoperability between agencies at all levels nationwide; and in the failure to share intelligence across agency boundaries. Examples of fog and friction abound in the War on Terror. Finally, Clausewitz said that, “The activities of war may be split into two main categories: those that are merely preparation for war, and [those that constitute] war proper.” Preparations for war produce “the end product,” trained and equipped fighting forces. War proper “on the other hand, is concerned with the use of these means, once they have been developed, for the purposes of [waging] the war.” (10) The purpose of war is presumed to be the imposition of one’s will upon one’s enemy. Similarly, the application of effort to the War on Terror should be divided into those activities that are preparations for war and those that are conduct of the war proper. Both activities are necessary, but each should be considered separately and not confused one for the other when evaluating success. Nor can they be separated from objective and strategy. The outcome of the Vietnam War is an example of the result that can occur when preparations for war and war proper are confused with objective and strategy. In referring to the United States defeat in Vietnam, Summers asks the question, “How could we have succeeded so well [tactically and logistically], yet failed so miserably [strategically]?” (11) He opens his analysis of the Vietnam War with this declaration: At the height of the war, the Army was able to move almost a million soldiers a year in and out of Vietnam, feed them, clothe them, house them, supply them with arms and ammunition, and generally sustain them better than any Army had ever been sustained in the field. To project an Army of that size halfway around the world was a logistics and management task of enormous magnitude, and we had been more than equal to the task. On the battlefield itself, the Army was unbeatable. In engagement after engagement, the forces of the Viet Cong and of the North Vietnamese Army were thrown back, with terrible losses. Yet, in the end, it was North Vietnam, not the United States that emerged victorious. (12) The Army’s accomplishments in Vietnam could not have been carried out without the application of preparations for war on a large scale. In essence, the Army did everything it was designed to do in Vietnam, but its successes did not achieve United States victory. The failure can be viewed in two ways. First, the activities that constituted preparations for war, e.g., logistics, personnel, and resource management were not always distinguished from war proper, resulting in misdirection of priorities. The result was a systems analysis approach to the Vietnam War that overrode strategic planning. More importantly, both preparations for war and war proper were directed toward an objective and strategy that were flawed. Regardless of the success of the military effort, it was in support of a flawed national objective and strategy that doomed the overall effort to ultimate strategic failure. The durability of the negative effects of strategic failure can be observed in the current debate in public forums on the nature and implications of the perceived threat to the nation. How does the United States avoid making a similar mistake in the War on Terror? Much of the current homeland security effort in the War on Terror – reorganization of government, critical infrastructure protection, and scenario-based planning are examples – are defensive actions that take on the guise of preparations for war. They do not, in and of themselves, directly impose America’s will on al Qaeda or any other adversary. It is not certain that they are even effective deterrents. Those offensive diplomatic, information, military, law enforcement, and economic actions that are taken to apply force directly to terrorist adversaries to force them to accept the will of the United States are examples of war proper. In the final analysis, it will be necessary for the United States to ensure that its efforts, both those that constitute preparation for war, as well as those that constitute war proper, are directed toward clearly defined, decisive and attainable national objectives and facilitated by a clear and effective strategy for success. This will require a transformation of strategic thought. United States war-fighting doctrine, founded in Clausewitzean principles of war between nation states, must be adapted in order to apply it to prevail against non-state entities. (1) Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605. (2) Ibid., 605. (3) Earl Tilford, “The War on Terror: World War IV,” A Reserve Officers Association National Security Report, Officer (October 2004), 37. (4) Clausewitz, On War. 75. (5) Ibid., 88. (6) Ibid., 80-81. (7) Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1984), 46. (8) Clausewitz, On War, 140. (9) Ibid., 119. (10) Ibid., 131-132. (11) Summers, On Strategy, 22. (12) Ibid., 21-22. ]]> tag:www.thestrategist.org,2007://1.54 2007-11-02T14:10:24Z 2007-11-02T14:18:07Z

In the realm of policy, first and foremost, the question must be asked: Is the United States truly at war in the war on terror? The determinations of the 9/11 Commission Report indicate that the United States is in popular...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org 9/11 Commission Report indicate that the United States is in popular deed, if not in legal fact, a nation at war, and lead to the Commission’s recommendations for establishing national objectives and a national strategy for conducting the war on terror. (1) The findings of the 9/11 Commission meet two of the three critical elements in Clausewitz’s military-political definition of war. First, that the effort is directed toward an identified opponent and, second, that it involves violence or use of force to compel our opponent to fulfill our will. According to the 9/11 Commission the United States’ opponent in the war on terror consists of the terrorist groups and their allies, particularly the global al Qaeda network, that form the threat of Islamist terrorism, thereby satisfying the first element of war: an effort directed at an identified opponent. (2) Although there are problems with this definition, particularly that it falls short of defining the full scope of the threat to the United States, it represents a start in developing a national objective and strategy. The use of American and allied forces to find and destroy terrorist groups, most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq, partially fulfills the second element of war: the use of violence or force to compel our opponent to meet our will. (3) The issue to be resolved is whether the insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Iraq are the right enemy, at the right time, and in the right place.]]> To declare war is not necessarily to dispatch troops, let alone atom bombs. It is to recognize a juridically altered relationship and to license such action as is deemed appropriate. It is a wonderful demystifier… [leaving] your objective in very plain view. (6) An acknowledgement of the need for the United States to establish objectives in the war on terror, and to develop a strategy to achieve those objectives, is found in the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that the United States should “consider what to do– the shape and objects of a strategy,” and “how to do it – organization of [the] government in a different way.” (7) The Commission’s recommended objectives are to attack terrorists and their organizations, prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks. The Commission says the strategy must incorporate offensive actions, with coalition partners, to counter terrorism; defensive actions with responsibilities for the nation’s defense clearly defined; a preventive strategy that is both political as well as military; and, finally, a responsive strategy that deals with attacks that are not prevented. Finally, the Commission recognized that if a national strategy is to be successful in the long-term, it must use all the elements of national power: intelligence, covert action, diplomacy, economic policy, foreign aid, and homeland defense. (8) From its recommendations it appears that the 9/11 Commission is suggesting a single overarching strategy for the United States in the war on terror. (1) The 9/11 Commission Report, Authorized Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004), 363. (2) Ibid, 363. (3) Ibid, 363. (4) Congressional Record 147 (2001), September 14. Public Law 107-40, 115 STAT. 224, Authorization For Use of Military Force. (5) Congressional Record 148 (2002), October 10. Public Law 107-243, 116 STAT. 1498, Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. (6) Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1984), 58; William F. Buckley, “George Kennan’s Bomb,” National Review (April 1980). As quoted by Colonel Summers. (7) 9/11 Commission Report, 361. (8) Ibid, 363. ]]> tag:www.thestrategist.org,2007://1.53 2007-10-08T17:09:22Z 2007-10-08T17:12:09Z

The lack of definition in the war on terror is problematic. While it allows national leaders the flexibility to define and redefine success in ways that suit political purposes, it also has potential drawbacks. From an operational perspective, it potentially...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org The lack of definition in the war on terror is problematic. While it allows national leaders the flexibility to define and redefine success in ways that suit political purposes, it also has potential drawbacks. From an operational perspective, it potentially leads to lack of clarity and understanding, and thus lack of focused national effort along with its attendant risk of failure. The very phrase “war on terror” lacks definition, and therefore presents the United States with a strategic issue that inhibits its efforts to prosecute the war effectively. As multiple sources have indicated, “terror” is not the enemy. In the “war” on terror, neither terror nor terrorism can be defeated since terror is a method and terrorism is a tactic. From this perspective, neither terror nor terrorism takes on the characteristics of entities that can be defeated in the traditional sense. The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, released by the White House, defined America’s enemy as “terrorism” in general. (1) The 9/11 Commission, perhaps recognizing the difficulty posed by the White House definition, provided a more precise description when it declared that “the enemy is not just ‘terrorism,’ some generic evil,” but must be the “threat posed by Islamist terrorism – especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology.”(2) However, even this clarification by the 9/11 Commission does not resolve the issue. As Jason Burke further notes, definitions are important. In Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, he points out that current definitions are subjective and, since terrorism is a tactic, the adoption by the United States of the phrase “war on terrorism” is nonsensical.(3) From an operational perspective, it does not allow a precise description of the problem confronting the nation. Earl Tilford goes even further in The War on Terror: World War IV and establishes a link between definitions and strategy when he declares that, in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, when the Bush Administration labeled its efforts the “war” on terror, it made a basic and fundamental strategic error.(4) From Tilford’s perspective, the error is so grave that it places the United States in the position of fighting a war that it could lose, similar to Vietnam, because it has misjudged the nature of its opponent. It is notable that the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the 2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism use identical wording in defining the enemy as “a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends.”(5) This definition continues to restrict the definition of the enemy by assigning it a connection to Islam. It also applies a mixed metaphor by establishing a connection between radical Islam – which is essentially a religion – and political ideological philosophies (rather than religious philosophies, which are cultural). Neither the White House, the Department of Defense, nor the 9/11 Commission adequately address non-state entities (whether domestic or transnational in origin) which are not connected to Islam. In the information age these networks represent a potential threat to the nation as great as that currently posed by al Qaeda. Lack of definition further complicates United States efforts in coming to grips with the entity known as “al Qaeda.” If al Qaeda represents the primary, or at least the most visible, opponent of the United States in the war on terror its precise nature remains unclear. From differing sources, it can be ascertained that al Qaeda is, variously, either a terrorist group,(6) a stateless network of terrorists that represents a radical movement in the Islamic world,(7) a venture capitalist firm that sponsors a terror network of networks,(8) or not a terrorist group at all but a worldwide insurgency.(9) Understanding the nature of al Qaeda is critical if the United States is to develop a clear strategy against it. Conventional strategic thinking calls for identifying and attacking an enemy’s centers of gravity. Each of the various definitions of al Qaeda invokes a different strategy; failure on the part of the United States to employ the correct strategic approach invites failure overall. Ultimately, in order to prevail against al Qaeda as a precursor to success in the war on terror, it may be necessary to accept several conditions: that al Qaeda is a non-state entity that possesses elements of each of the definitions above; that it is constantly evolving its methods, tactics, and philosophy, i.e., the very essence of what it is; that it is very successful in attracting adherents; and that it may represent the forerunner of both terrorism and warfare in the information age. In this sense conventional strategic thinking may not be effective in warring against al Qaeda. The definition of victory, or even success, in the war on terror is also problematic. The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism establishes this when it states: “The long-term solution for winning the war on terror is the advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy.”(10) The means to be used by the United States to advance democracy are not clear. How will the United States know when it has advanced democracy far enough that it can declare it has won the war on terror? The implication of this definition is that it offers no definable end state, no reasonable expectation that the war on terror can be brought to a conclusion. As a matter of practicality, it may not be possible to defeat or eliminate terrorist groups entirely. The strategic alternatives of rollback or containment of terrorism may be more feasible goals.(11) A final definition which poses difficulty for the United States in the war on terror is the legal status of its adversaries. Are individuals who carry out terrorist acts against the United States and its interests criminals or are they armed combatants? The difference is critical in crafting a wartime strategy that bridges the foreign-domestic divide defined by the 9/11 Commission.(12) A primary example is the legal status of the al Qaeda detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States should develop a coalition approach for the detention and humane treatment of captured transnational terrorists, possibly structured on Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions on the law of armed conflict. This is at least tacit acknowledgment that the detainees are recognized as armed combatants and should be accorded some of the protections of the Geneva Conventions.(13) However, in a decision that was issued nearly simultaneously with the release of The 9/11 Commission Report, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that detainees at Guantanamo Bay can take their cases – that they are unlawfully imprisoned – to the American court system.(14) The Court further reinforced its position in 2006 when it ruled against Bush Administration efforts to conduct war crimes trials for some detainees at Guantanamo Bay.(15) The impact of the Court’s rulings is that they call into question whether the United States is legally at war in the war on terror, or whether it is actually pursuing a law enforcement action. By offering the protection of the United States legal system to the detainees, it appears that the Supreme Court does not recognize the war on terror as a war according to legal and historical definitions. As indicated above, many of the issues that currently affect the war on terror can be traced to lack of definition, lack of clarity, and a diffused rather than focused effort. This has the benefit of allowing policy makers to maintain flexibility in defining and re-defining success in many ways. However, it poses great difficulty in developing effective strategy and conducting focused operations. Lack of definition also affects, for good or bad, the application of doctrine, policy, and transformation concepts to the war on terror. (1) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003. 1. (2) 9/11 Commission Report, 362. (3) Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (New York: I.B. Taurus & Co Ltd, 2004), 22. (4) Earl Tilford, “The War on Terror: World War IV,” A Reserve Officers Association National Security Report, Officer (October 2004), 38. (5) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006. 5; Department of Defense, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (2006), 4. (6) United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Handbook No.1, A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (2005), Appendix A. (7) The 9/11 Commission Report, 362-363. (8) Bruce Hoffman, “The Leadership Secrets of Osama Bin Laden: The Terrorist as CEO,” Atlantic Monthly (April 2002). (9) Anonymous (Michael Scheur), Imperial Hubris, 62. (10) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,2006. 9. (11) Stephen D. Biddle, “American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2005, 28. (12) The 9/11 Commission Report, 399. (13) Ibid., 379-380. (14) Rasul et al v. Bush, President of the United States, et al., 542 U.S. 03-334 and 03-343 (2004). The majority ruling of the Supreme Court was that United States courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay. As the Supreme Court ruled, the Guantanamo Bay detainees: are not nationals of countries at war with the United States; deny they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United States; have never been afforded access to any tribunal and therefore have never been tried and convicted of wrongdoing; for more than two years have been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control. (15) Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al., 548 U.S. 05-184 (2006). The majority ruling of the Supreme Court was that it has jurisdiction to hear the case of an accused combatant before his military commission takes place; that the federal government did not have authority to set up these particular special military commissions; and that the special military commissions were illegal under both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Convention of 1949. tag:www.thestrategist.org,2007://1.52 2007-10-08T03:01:27Z 2007-10-08T03:09:37Z

As the United States enters its seventh year in the War on Terror its spending in the total effort is approaching a trillion dollars and its military and civilian casualties combined are approaching 40,000 people. These sacrifices, and more, may...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org As the United States enters its seventh year in the War on Terror its spending in the total effort is approaching a trillion dollars and its military and civilian casualties combined are approaching 40,000 people. These sacrifices, and more, may be the price for the post-9/11 security of the nation. However, they are significant and they do justify an accounting by American leaders. Three questions can be raised: • Are we winning the War on Terror? • Is the War in Iraq making us safer? • Do our elected leaders understand the strategic situation the nation faces? Results Of The Terrorism Index In August the Center for American Progress published the results of its third Terrorism Index. They can be found on-line at: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/08/terrorism_index.html A survey of more than 100 of American foreign-policy experts by the Center provides unsettling insights into the questions above. According to the Center the experts they interviewed “see a world that is growing more dangerous, a national security strategy in disrepair, and a war in Iraq that is alarmingly off course.” Some of the results: Are we winning the War on Terror? In response to the statement “The United States is winning the War on Terror,” 6% agreed, 84% disagreed. Is the War in Iraq making us safer? In response to the question “Do you think the world is becoming safer or more dangerous for the United States and the American people?,” 2% answered safer, 91% answered more dangerous. According to the Center, the War in Iraq “appears to be the root cause of the experts’ pessimism about the state of national security.” Nearly all of those interviewed – 92 % – said the War in Iraq negatively affects United States national security. Do our elected leaders understand the strategic situation the nation faces? The comments of American national leaders are often at odds with the results of the Index. As reported by the Center: Sen. Hillary Clinton: “I believe we are safer than we were.” – June 3, 2007 Terrorism Index Experts: A huge majority, 91 percent, believe the world is growing more dangerous for Americans and the United States. Mayor Rudy Giuliani: “I support the president’s increase in troops. Even more importantly, I support the change in strategy. . . .” – January 10, 2007 Terrorism Index Experts: The majority, 83 percent, believe the surge has had either a negative impact or no impact at all on the war in Iraq. Sen. John McCain: “We lose this war and come home, they’ll follow us home.” – March 10, 2007 Terrorism Index Experts: Nearly 9 in 10 say that they do not believe terrorist attacks would occur inside the United States as the result of a withdrawal from Iraq. Sen. Barack Obama: “We must maintain the isolation of Hamas.” – March 2, 2007 Terrorism Index Experts: More than 70 percent believe the United States should engage, not isolate, Hamas. Gov. Mitt Romney: “This is a time . . . to increase our diplomatic isolation of Iran.” –February 18, 2007 Terrorism Index Experts: Eight in 10 support engaging in bilateral dialogue with Tehran over its nuclear program. Sen. John Edwards: “[Congress] should correct its mistake and use its constitutional funding power to force an immediate withdrawal from Iraq.” – July 10, 2007 Terrorism Index Experts: Almost 80 percent of the experts oppose an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Conclusion: It is not surprising that the statements of political leaders who are competing for national office are at odds with the more measured positions of experts from defense, industry, and academia. However, the most critical issue may be the question not asked: Do we have effective strategies to win the War on Terror, and are they on track? The future security of the nation hinges on the answer.]]> tag:www.thestrategist.org,2007://1.51 2007-06-12T03:35:48Z 2007-06-12T04:00:26Z

Premise We have to ask ourselves, in the post-modern era of war that is characterized by the information age, if we – the United States – are capable of waging the type of asymmetrical warfare necessary to achieve success in...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org Premise We have to ask ourselves, in the post-modern era of war that is characterized by the information age, if we – the United States – are capable of waging the type of asymmetrical warfare necessary to achieve success in the War on Terror. Specifically: 1. As a great power nation state can we successfully wage asymmetrical warfare? 2. As a liberal western democracy can we maintain the national will necessary to define and achieve success in the War on Terror? ]]> The First Question An unsettling answer to the first question is provided by a study conducted by Jason Lyall of Princeton University and Lieutenant Colonel Isaiah Wilson III of the United States Military Academy at West Point. In their study titled The American Way of War and Peace in Comparative Perspective Lyall and Wilson studied 268 conflicts between 1809 and 2003, including 49 conventional wars (between great power nation states), 134 small wars (between stronger nation states and weaker nation states), and 159 insurgencies (between nation states and insurgencies).(1) Their conclusion is counterintuitive: during the time period studied great power nation states, including the United States, increased both their military and economic power but witnessed a dramatic decrease in their ability to win small wars and against insurgencies. Although great power nation states are vastly more powerful today than in the 19th century, the analysis showed they have become far less likely to win asymmetrical wars. Among their findings: • In small wars great power nation states’ success rates halved over time, from 100% success from 1800-1850, to 50% success in 1950-2003. • Against insurgencies, great power nation states’ success rates drastically declined from 89% success from 1800-1850, to 21% success from 1950-2003. A conclusion from the results produced by Lyall and Wilson is that the more industrialized a powerful country becomes, the more its military becomes technologically powerful, the less effective it seems to be in asymmetrical warfare. They find that, beginning around 1900, the more advanced a nation state is, measured by its conventional military capacity and its energy consumption/steel production, the less probable it is to achieve strategic victory in both small wars and insurgencies. Their data also provides tentative evidence that as the economies of great power nation states move away from capitalist models, they have a higher probability of winning in small wars and against insurgencies. These results call into the question the capability of great power nation states to successfully wage asymmetrical warfare. The Second Question The second question requires an examination of the national will. An examination of the branches of American government – the executive, the legislative, and the judicial – reveals a lack of unity concerning the political will of the government. In the opening words of the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, released by the White House, the executive branch states unambiguously that, “America is at war with a transnational terrorist movement fueled by a radical ideology of hatred, oppression, and murder.”(2) Although this would presume to resolve the issue the actions of the legislative and judicial branches of the government are not in accordance with the position of the executive branch. In 2004 the United States Supreme Court ruled that War on Terror detainees at Guantanamo Bay can take their cases that they are unlawfully imprisoned to the American court system.(3) The Court further reinforced its position in 2006 when it later ruled against Bush Administration efforts to conduct war crimes trials for some detainees at Guantanamo Bay.(4) The impact of the Court’s rulings are that they call into question whether the United States is legally at war in the War on Terror, or whether it is actually pursuing a law enforcement action. By offering protections of the United States legal system to the detainees, it appears that the judicial branch does not recognize the War on Terror as a war according to legal and historical definitions. Nearly six years after the attacks of 9/11 the executive and judicial branches of government remain at odds over the War on Terror as the Bush administration’s attempt to create an alternative justice system for terrorism suspects has yet to complete a single trial.(5) The conflict between the two branches was highlighted again in 2007 when military judges threw out war-crimes cases against the only detainees who have been indicted - Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a former driver and bodyguard for Osama bin Laden, and Omar Khadr, a Canadian who was 15 when arrested five years ago in a firefight with U.S. forces in Afghanistan. At issue is the legal status of the prisoners being held at Guantanamo, and whether they are “enemy combatants” or “unlawful alien enemy combatants.” The military tribunals have jurisdiction only over the latter; however, in their 2004 Combatant Status Review Tribunals the prisoners at Guantanamo were given the former designation. These rulings by military judges suggest the judicial branch’s position that the hastily reassembled military tribunals have no jurisdiction over any of Guantanamo's 380 prisoners.(6) The conflict between the legislative and the executive branches of government has its roots in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which gives to Congress – the elected representatives of the American people – the power to declare war. A declaration of war – to establish the national will – therefore becomes a shared responsibility between the political will of the government and the popular will of its constituents. This is more than just a formality. Failure by Congress to declare war in Vietnam led to a failure to mobilize the second element of the national will, the popular will of the United States public, and ultimately contributed to the nation’s defeat. A declaration of war gives the President clear-cut military authority, as well as non-military options, including internment of armed combatants and seizure of foreign funds and assets. It is significant that, while Congress passed Public Laws 107-40 (2001) and 107-243 (2002) giving the President broad powers to prosecute the War on Terror, these laws, from a legal perspective, have never constituted a formal declaration of war. Under the provisions of Public Law 107-40, the President is authorized to use force against those nations, organizations, or persons who planned and carried out the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and those that harbored them, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.(7) Public Law 107-243 authorizes the President to use the armed forces of the United States to defend the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.(8) In the November, 2005, midterm elections the American public used the ballot box to demonstrate the turning of the public will against that part of the War on Terror represented by the War in Iraq. This election was more about the failure of American leadership and the absence of grand strategy in the War in Iraq than anything else. By taking control of the Congress and the Senate from the Republican Party and giving it to the Democratic Party, the public demonstrated as clearly as it did during the Vietnam War that it has turned against the prosecution by the executive branch of the War in Iraq. In 2007 the American public continued to demonstrate its opposition to the War in Iraq. At a time when the Army and the Marine Corps are in need of recruits to fight in Iraq, as well as Afghanistan, those who influence young people to join the military have demonstrated an increased reluctance to do so. In a survey reported by the Washington Examiner the percentage of non-parent adults who were likely or very likely to recommend joining the military went from 60 percent to 40 percent. Parents dropped from 40 percent to 28 percent, with mothers at 25 percent, down from 36 percent.(9) The actions of the 110th Congress since the November, 2006, midterm elections indicate that the legislative branch, following the will of the American public, is at great odds with the executive branch over the War on Terror, particularly the portion represented by the War in Iraq. Since assuming its duties, the 110th Congress has clearly demonstrated that it is locked in a battle of wills with the executive branch over which branch will exercise final authority over the War in Iraq. Accordingly, it has moved repeatedly – albeit unsuccessfully thus far – to withdraw many of the powers it formerly gave to the executive branch in Public Laws 107-40 and 107-243. The Way Ahead The issues above are critical to the future security of the nation and its success in the War on Terror. In the post-modern era of war, against the growing number of entities capable of waging asymmetrical warfare, the United States will find increasing challenges to its national authority, national interests, and national will. If it is to successfully confront these challenges, and overcome the trends documented by Lyall and Wilson, it must do three things. First, it must take a long strategic view and ensure its security by embracing asymmetric warfare.(10) As the era evolves, its opponents will learn and adapt; for every approach there will be counter-developments and counter-tactics. The United States must always consider its options. Containment or rollback of terrorism networks and other non-state entities may at times be a better alternative than unconditional defeat. It is therefore necessary for the United States to employ ruthless strategic objectivity mixed with only one balancing consideration: Is the probable long-term outcome really worth American sacrifice? Second, focusing solely on the military dimension is an almost certain path to grand strategic failure in the post-modern era of war. It will be necessary to use all the elements of national power and influence in unconventional fashion. The concept of force must be expanded beyond mere military force to encompass social force, political force, economic force, technical force, and beyond. Shaping conflict termination, and the grand strategic aftermath, is the primary definition of success; it will require operations over periods of many years, and more likely, decades. It will also require brutal honesty in preparing the American public for the true nature of warfare in the information age. Without public support the nation’s security cannot be achieved. Finally, it will be necessary to maintain the national will by focusing relentlessly on desired outcomes and grand strategy, and not individual events. The nation cannot afford to underestimate its enemies or its own vulnerabilities as it has in the War on Terror; capable opponents will always fight the United States either above or below its threshold of conventional war fighting capability. The weak can defeat the strong through merciless unconventional methods, and the first rule of asymmetric warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden. To achieve success requires winning in the information, cognitive, and social domains, but not necessarily in the physical or military domain. The United States must develop its own version of asymmetric warfare to achieve strategic success and avoid Pyrrhic outcomes such as those produced thus far against al Qaeda in the War on Terror. More than ever, the words of Lord Palmerston and Niall Ferguson will ring true for the United States in the post-modern era of war – in a time characterized by disintegration as much as integration the United States has no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies, but as a nation it does have perpetual and eternal strategic interests to follow. (1) Jason Lyall and Lieutenant Colonel Isaiah Wilson III, “The American Way of War and Peace in Comparative Perspective (Draft).” http://www.princeton.edu/~jlyall/USWayofWar_FinalVersion.pdf (accessed 03/06/07) (2) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006, 1. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf (accessed 09/07/06) (3) Rasul et al v. Bush, President of the United States, et al., 542 U.S. 03-334 and 03-343 (2004). The majority ruling of the Supreme Court was that United States courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay. As the Supreme Court pointed out, the Guantanamo Bay detainees: are not nationals of countries at war with the United States; deny they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United States; have never been afforded access to any tribunal and therefore have never been tried and convicted of wrongdoing; for more than two years have been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control. (4) Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al., 548 U.S. 05-184 (2006). The majority ruling of the Supreme Court was that it has jurisdiction to hear the case of an accused combatant before his military commission takes place; that the federal government did not have authority to set up these particular special military commissions; and that the special military commissions were illegal under both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Convention of 1949. (5) Adam Liptak, “Tribunal System, Newly Righted, Stumbles Again,” New York Times (June 5, 2007). (6) Carol J. Williams and Julian E. Barnes, “Tribunals Are Dealt Another Legal Setback,” Los Angeles Times (June 5, 2007), 1. (7) Congressional Record 147 (2001), September 14. Public Law 107-40, 115 STAT. 224, Authorization For Use of Military Force. (8) Congressional Record 148 (2002), October 10. Public Law 107-243, 116 STAT. 1498, Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. (9) Rowan Scarborough, “Interest In Military Service Plummets Among The Young,” Washington Examiner (June 4, 2007). (10) Anthony Cordesman, “Rethinking the Challenge of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Working Notes,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 7, 2005. http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/051107_counterinsurg.pdf (accessed 06/07/07). ]]> tag:www.thestrategist.org,2007://1.50 2007-01-28T21:32:38Z 2007-06-12T01:17:03Z

Visionary leadership will be a critical component of American success in both the war in Iraq as well as the war on terror. In his book, Fiasco, author Thomas E. Ricks revives the phrase “lions led by donkeys” to describe...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org Fiasco, author Thomas E. Ricks revives the phrase “lions led by donkeys” to describe his view of the poor leadership of American soldiers in Iraq during the winter of 2003-4. He borrows the popular use of the phrase from German generals who used it to describe the British army in World War I, when British soldiers were led by their generals into battles that became mass slaughters. In referring to them as “lions led by donkeys” Ricks finds little to fault the front line American soldiers in Iraq but much to criticize about their senior military and civilian leaders. He quotes one un-named general who describes Iraq in the winter of 2003-4 as, “Tactically we were fine. Operationally, we were usually okay. Strategically – we were a basket case.” (1) The Current Situation After more than four years of fighting the United States may be on the verge of finding out if its military effort in Iraq remains vulnerable to being characterized as “lions led by donkeys.” On January 10, 2007, President Bush unveiled his administration’s latest strategy for the war in Iraq. The announcement represents both a concession that United States strategy up to now in Iraq has not brought success, as well as acknowledgement that the administration has lost the support of the American public for the war. Key elements of the strategy include the deployment of an additional 20,000 (+) American troops to Baghdad to establish security; new diplomatic initiatives with Iraq’s regional neighbors; doubling the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq; and a set of benchmarks for the Iraqi Government to achieve prior to the beginning of American withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2007.(2) ]]> Counterinsurgency.(3) Whether his dispatch back to Iraq is simply an example of a good general being handed a bad mission, as has been suggested by Time magazine, remains to be seen.(4) During his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 23, 2007, General Petraeus demonstrated that, perhaps more than any other senior American leader, he understands the nature of the war in Iraq, thus elevating him above Ricks’ “lions led by donkeys” analogy. Among the critical points made by General Petraeus in his testimony:(5) • The prospect of a failed Iraq is in no one’s interest – globally, regionally, for the United States, nor for the Iraqi people. • There is no military solution to the current situation in Iraq. Ultimate success will come in the Iraqi political and economic arenas, and will be dependent on the provision of basic services, the establishment of rule of law, and economic development. • Iraq and its fledgling government are beset by insurgents, international terrorists, sectarian militias, regional meddling, violent criminals, government dysfunction, and corruption. Military action to improve security is necessary to establish the environment necessary for social, political, and economic success. • The commitment from the United States is both sizeable and long-term, and will require the participation of all the departments of the federal government. Although the administration’s latest strategy for the war in Iraq may succeed, it has some formidable obstacles to overcome. Even in victory, as Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz noted, the result in war is never final.(6) Nor is it ever certain. An examination of the principles in Counterinsurgency provides insight into the apparent lack of United States progress thus far in Iraq, and reveals the nature of the obstacles to success it faces if it is to reverse course. As corollary to the new strategy for Iraq are the implications it raises for the United States effort against the global insurgency of al Qaeda in the larger war on terror. Principles Of Counterinsurgency Insurgency is not a new form of warfare, having been around for as long as war has existed. However, following its experience in Vietnam the United States Army removed virtually all references to fighting insurgencies from its doctrinal manuals, and built an Army centered on high-technology maneuver warfare. After re-learning old counterinsurgency lessons anew in Iraq, these are the principles for fighting insurgencies that General Petraeus prescribes in Counterinsurgency.(7) They are broken into three categories – historical principles, contemporary imperatives, and paradoxes of insurgencies. Historical Principles For Counterinsurgency Legitimacy Is The Main Objective: The primary objective of any counterinsurgency operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by the balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means. Unity Of Effort Is Essential: Ideally, a single counterinsurgent leader has authority over all government agencies involved in counterinsurgency operations. Political Factors Are Primary: Military actions may appear predominant as security forces conduct operations to secure the populace and kill or capture insurgents; however, political objectives must guide the military’s approach. Counterinsurgents Must Understand The Environment: Counterintelligence operations require a greater emphasis on certain skills, such as language and cultural understanding, than does conventional warfare. Intelligence Drives Operations: Without good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like blind boxers wasting energy flailing at unseen opponents and perhaps causing unintended harm. Effective operations are shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence. Insurgents Must Be Isolated From Their Cause And Support: It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent. Dynamic insurgencies can replace losses quickly. Skillful counterinsurgents must thus cut off the sources of that recuperative power. Some sources can be reduced by redressing the social, political, and economic grievances that fuel the insurgency. Security Under The Rule Of Law Is Essential: Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads. Counterinsurgents Should Prepare For A Long-Term Commitment: Planning and commitments should be based on sustainable operating tempo and personnel tempo limits for the various components of the force. At the strategic level, gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a protracted deployment is critical. Contemporary Imperatives Of Counterinsurgency Manage Information And Expectations: Create and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the populace, friendly military forces, and the international community. Use The Appropriate Level Of Force: Calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who wields it for any operation. An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents. Learn And Adapt: Insurgents constantly shift between military and political phases and tactics. In addition, networked insurgents constantly exchange information about their enemy’s vulnerabilities—even with insurgents in distant theaters. However, skillful counterinsurgents can adapt at least as fast as insurgents. Empower The Lowest Levels: Higher commanders empower subordinates to make decisions within the commander’s intent. They leave details of execution to their subordinates and expect them to use initiative and judgment to accomplish the mission. Support The Host Nation: In the end, the host nation has to win on its own. Achieving this requires development of viable local leaders and institutions. Paradoxes Of Counterinsurgency Operations Sometimes, The More You Protect Your Force, The Less Secure You May Be: Ultimate success is gained by protecting the populace, not the counterinsurgency force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Sometimes, The More Force Is Used, The Less Effective It Is: The more force applied, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. In contrast, using force precisely and discriminately strengthens the rule of law that needs to be established. The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is, The Less Force Can Be Used And the More Risk Must Be Accepted: As the level of insurgent violence drops, the requirements of international law and the expectations of the populace lead to a reduction in direct military actions by counterinsurgents. More reliance is placed on police work, rules of engagement may be tightened, and troops may have to exercise increased restraint. Sometimes Doing Nothing Is The Best Reaction: If an assessment of the effects of a course of action determines that more negative than positive effects may result, an alternative should be considered—potentially including not acting. Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot: While security is essential to setting the stage for overall progress, lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation, and restored hope. Particularly after security has been achieved, dollars and ballots will have more important effects than bombs and bullets. The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably Is Normally Better Than Us Doing It Well: Long-term success requires establishing viable host nation leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant U.S. support. The longer that process takes, the more U.S. public support will wane and the more the local populace will question the legitimacy of their own forces and government. If A Tactic Works This Week, It Might Not Work Next Week; If It Works In This Province, It Might Not Work In The Next: Competent insurgents are adaptive. They are often part of a widespread network that communicates constantly and instantly. There is no “silver bullet” set of counterinsurgency procedures. Constantly developing new practices is essential. Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing: As important as they are in security, military actions by themselves cannot achieve success in counterinsurgency. Insurgents that never defeat counterinsurgents in combat still may achieve their strategic objectives. Tactical actions thus must be linked not only to strategic and operational military objectives but also to the host nation’s essential political goals. Without those connections, lives and resources may be wasted for no real gain. Many Important Decisions Are Not Made By Generals: Successful counterinsurgency operations require competence and judgment at all levels. Young leaders often make decisions at the tactical level that have strategic consequences. Senior leaders set the proper direction and climate with thorough training and clear guidance; then they trust their subordinates to do the right thing. Potential Obstacles To Success Regardless of his formidable intellectual and leadership skills, it is not certain that the counterinsurgency concepts developed by General Petraeus will bring success in Iraq. He has some significant obstacles to overcome, any of which could become a “show stopper” in military parlance. First of all, it has not been clear from that beginning that United States policy understands its tools. This is evident in its nearly exclusive reliance thus far upon military means as its primary tool to establish the necessary social, political, and economic pre-conditions and processes for democracy to flourish in Iraq. The United States government has not engaged all the elements of national power by requiring the full commitment of all its federal departments to the effort.(8) Overall, the result has been a problematic approach that violates the first historical principle of counterinsurgency: Legitimacy is the main objective and is achieved by the balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means. Second, President Bush’s initiative may be a classic case of too little, too late. The results in Iraq have demonstrated that Army General Eric Shinseki was correct in February, 2003, when he testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that it would require a peacekeeping force of several hundred thousand soldiers to control the postwar environment in Iraq. Events have proven that General Shinseki’s estimate remains accurate, although the Bush Administration has never accepted it, and Shinseki was essentially sacked as Army Chief of Staff for his public stance. The surge of 20,000 (+) troops will bring force totals in Iraq to somewhere around 170,000 (+) people, hardly 50% of the number estimated by Shinseki as necessary to ensure success. Further, the surge is temporary if the administration maintains its position that it will begin withdrawing American forces whether or not the Iraq government has achieved its benchmark of taking responsibility for security of all its provinces by November, 2007. The signal sent to the Iraq insurgents is one of American short-term commitment. This violates the eighth historical principle of counterinsurgency: Counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment based on sustainable operating tempo and personnel tempo. Third, the effort in Iraq must succeed despite a fractured national will. The outcome of the national midterm elections of November 7, 2006, signaled a fracturing of the first element of the American national will – popular support for the war in Iraq. By taking control of the Congress and the Senate from the Republican Party and giving it to the Democratic Party, the public demonstrated that it has withdrawn its support from the Bush Administration in the war in Iraq. The public mood was further revealed in a Washington Post-ABC News public poll conducted December 7-11, 2006, which revealed that 69% of the public support withdrawing most combat forces from Iraq by early 2008, and that 52% believe the United States is losing the war.(9) Declarations by Democratic Party leaders in the 110th Congress of their intent to take budgeting authority for the war in Iraq from the White House, and the follow-on Senate debate over a non-binding resolution condemning the surge of additional troops to Iraq, represent a fracturing of the second element of the national will, the political will. Taken together, these developments are indications that the public no longer supports the government, and that within the government the executive and legislative branches are at odds, over the war in Iraq. In American history, where there is no national will, there can be no sustained war. This also violates the eighth historical principle of counterinsurgency: Counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment based on sustainable operating tempo and personnel tempo. Fourth, tactical success does not always equate to strategic success. For example, in Vietnam the United States expended the majority of its tactical efforts against the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam, which it viewed as the main North Vietnamese effort. Although American forces succeeded in destroying the Viet Cong insurgency, they did not thwart North Vietnam’s strategic objective of undermining American public support for the war, thereby causing the United States to withdraw from South Vietnam. This principle is linked to the eighth paradox of counterinsurgency operations: Tactical success, as described by Ricks above, guarantees nothing by itself, but must be linked not only to strategic and operational military objectives but also to essential political goals. Fifth, the United States Army, which continues to carry the brunt of the war in Iraq, with more than 3,500 soldiers killed and nearly 24,000 wounded since the start of the war, is showing signs of strain not seen since the decade following the end of the Vietnam War. As reported in Time magazine, after extended deployments and engagements over the past four years to fight a type of war in Afghanistan and Iraq for which it was never doctrinally designed, equipped, or trained the signs of stress are apparent in the personnel ranks, as well as in the condition of its equipment.(10) For the first time in modern history the United States is fighting an extended war with a volunteer military. Although the Army appears to be maintaining its all-volunteer force, it is paying a steep cost according to Time. To maintain enlistments it has lowered its percentage of high school graduates from 94% (2003) to 81% (2006); increased the number of waivers for enlistees with criminal records, medical problems, or poor aptitude scores from 4,918 (2003) to 8,129 (2006); increased the maximum age for enlistment from 35 to 42; implemented a measure known as “stop-loss” to involuntarily hold 70,000 soldiers past their enlistment obligations; increased the amount paid in enlistment and retention bonuses from $328 million (2002) to more than $1.09 billion (2006) (11); and has considered opening recruiting offices in foreign countries to fill personnel shortfalls. Within the officer ranks the Army is short about 3,000 mid-level officers (through 2013) as a result of overly-deep personnel cuts made about 10 years ago. It has critical officer shortages in aviation, intelligence, engineering and military police – specialties which are in higher demand for counterinsurgency operations. A shift in attitudes across the ranks is reflected in a December, 2006, poll taken by the Army Times which reflects that the number of troops who think victory is likely in Iraq has fallen from 83% to 50%. After decades of building a smaller, high-tech maneuver force, an inspector general report concluded that in the environment of Iraq service members were not always equipped to effectively complete their missions. On April 12, 2007, standard combat tours for soldiers in Iraq, many of whom are on their third deployments, were increased to 15 months, the longest since the Vietnam War.(12) Taken together, these factors indicate the Army is an institution under stress and run counter to the fourth principal of contemporary imperatives of counterinsurgency: Empower the lowest levels to make decisions within the commander’s intent. Finally, the enemy has a vote. As Clausewitz noted, “war is not an exercise of the will directed at inanimate matter…In war, the will is directed at an animate object that reacts.” (13) The nature of the continuous and dynamic give-and-take interaction between opponents in war makes its outcome unpredictable. This principle is embodied in the seventh paradox of counterinsurgency operations: If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next. There is no “silver bullet” set of counterinsurgency procedures. Corollary To The War On Terror The implications of the American experience in Iraq carry over to the larger war on terror. Today’s homeland security environment consists of networks of complex, interconnected, adaptive threats that extend beyond the domain of historic law enforcement or military operations. They utilize strategies and methods similar to those of both the global insurgency of al Qaeda and the insurgency in Iraq and, thus, require a similar counterinsurgency-like response. The principles for conducting counterinsurgencies outlined above are readily adaptable to the war on terror. The United States has the resources to succeed in the war on terror but no single government department or agency has or will have sufficient resources to conduct homeland security operations unilaterally. Considerable challenges, bearing resemblance to the obstacles described above, require visionary leadership on the part of America’s homeland security leaders. The solutions in the war on terror are not military in nature. Therefore, homeland security leaders must ensure the social, political, and economic pre-conditions are established for success in the war on terror, both globally as well as domestically. To do so, they must use all the tools of policy available to the nation. They must allocate the necessary resources, in the right way, to develop and maintain a capable force of first responders. In the war on terror first responders are as critical to America’s security as its Army. Despite the expenditure thus far by the United States of some $843 billion on the war on terror, indicators are that both the threats and incidents of global jihadist terrorism have increased.(14) The application of resources alone to the war on terror will not be enough – new and innovative ways of thinking are needed to defeat adaptive enemies. Similar to Iraq, strategy must extend across agency boundaries and integrate the full range of interagency efforts to most effectively meet current and future homeland security needs. General Petraeus appears to be the right military leader for the war in Iraq; similar visionary leaders are needed in homeland security and the war on terror. It is of paramount importance for homeland security leaders to ensure that first responders, the nation’s first line of domestic defense in the war on terror, are not labeled by future historians as “lions led by donkeys.” (1) Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure In Iraq, (The Penguin Press, New York 2006), 308. (2) George W. Bush, President’s Address To The Nation, Washington, D.C., January 10, 2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/ (accessed 01/15/07) (3) Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, December, 2006. http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf (accessed 01/15/07). (4) Joe Klein, “When Bad Missions Happen to Good Generals,” Time (January 22, 2007), 25. (5) Transcript, “General Petraeus’s Opening Statement,” The New York Times (January 23, 2007). http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/23/world/middleeast/24petraeustextcnd.html?ex=1176177600&en=c5106ff0606df81b&ei=5070 (accessed 4/8/2007). (6) Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 80. (7) Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-20. (8) The 9/11 Commission Report, Authorized Edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004), 361-398. Chapter 12 of The 9/11 Commission Report lays out a blueprint for a United States global strategy in the War on Terror that calls for employment of all the elements of national power. (9) Peter Baker and Jon Cohen, “Americans Say U.S. Is Losing War,” Washington Post (December 13, 2006). (10) Mark Thompson, “Broken Down,” Time (April 16, 2007), 28. (11) Tom Vanden Brook, “Army Pays $1 Billion To Recruit And Retain Soldiers,” USA TODAY (April 12, 2007), 8A. (12) Tom Vanden Brook and Greg Zoroya, “Soldiers’ Combat Tours Get Longer,” USA TODAY (April 12, 2007), 1. (13) Clausewitz, On War, 149, 139, and 253 respectively. (14) Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Five Years Later: Funding For Defense, Military Operations, Homeland Security, And Related Activities Since 9/11 (September 7, 2006), 1. Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “Brutal Reality: The War Is Fueling Global Jihad,” New York Daily News (February 21, 2007), 15. ]]> tag:www.thestrategist.org,2006://1.49 2006-12-21T16:03:06Z 2006-12-21T23:24:13Z

On December 6, 2006, the independent Iraq Study Group released its long-anticipated report to a great deal of media and public fanfare.(1) The letter from the co-chairs of the Iraq Study Group states in its opening paragraph that “Our country...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org “Our country deserves a debate that prizes substance over rhetoric…” The resulting fire storm of debate was, in fact, immediate, ranging from the positive to the negative, depending on the political persuasion of the analysts and commentators. Political conservatives denigrated the report as defeatist, while liberals used the report as evidence of the failure of the Bush Administration to effectively prosecute the war in Iraq. Depending on which think tank analysis of the report is believed, it (the report) either goes too far, or it doesn’t go far enough in its recommendation for a new approach to the war. One analysis characterizes the report as “a triumph of hope over experience.”(2) Common phrases that have been bandied about in the media analysis of the report run the gamut from “cut and run” or “stay the course” to the Pentagon’s announced alternatives of “go big,” “go long,” or “go home.” Regardless of political persuasion one theme runs consistently throughout the debate – that of near-unanimous rejection of the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.]]> “Maybe we don't need a national debate. Maybe what we really need are leaders with more character, followers with more discrimination, deciders who hear as well as listen and media that know the difference between the public interest and what the public is interested in.”(3) Kaplan may be right; after more than three-and- a-half years of war the nation has had more than enough time to debate its actions. However, the stakes are high. The immediate dilemma is Iraq, but the larger stakes are the stability of the Middle East, America’s role in the world, and the future state of global political, security, economic, and social stability.(4) If the war in Iraq is one element of the larger global war on terror, then the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group bear serious scrutiny because their implications carry over to the war on terror. Regardless of the terms, and of the level of debate, one critical point has thus far been overlooked: The Iraq Study Group Report is founded on assumptions. The validity of the assumptions drives the feasibility of the recommendations within the report. A process exists that can be used to illustrate the point. Military planners use a mission analysis process that requires as one of its steps the identification of critical assumptions.(5) From a planning perspective assumptions are suppositions about the current or future situation that are assumed to be true in the absence of true facts. They take the place of necessary, but unavailable, facts and fill the gaps in what is known about a situation. Assumptions must meet two criteria to be included in the planning process: First, they must be valid – meaning they are likely to be true. Second, they must be necessary – meaning they are essential for planning. Assumptions that do not meet these two criteria must either be discarded, or if they are accepted they call into question the validity of the plan. Using these criteria the following assumptions must be applied to the Iraq Study Group Report if its recommendations are to truly be considered as a way ahead: Letter from the Co-Chairs • Assumption 1: The United States has the national will to see the war in Iraq to completion. • Assumption 2: American public support for the war in Iraq can be restored. • Assumption 3: The Executive and the Legislative branches of the United States government will cooperate to find a way forward in Iraq. External Approach • Assumption 4: The United States can implement effective diplomatic and political initiatives to achieve international consensus for stability in Iraq and the Middle East. • Assumption 5: The United States will engage all the elements of American power in Iraq; in addition to the Defense Department, the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, and the Director of National Intelligence in particular. • Assumption 6: The United States will not be confronted by global crises requiring the precipitate diversion of its military forces from Iraq. • Assumption 7: The United States can broker comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace to resolve regional instability. • Assumption 8: Iraq’s neighbors want a stable and prosperous Iraq. • Assumption 9: Other nations, and Iraq’s neighbors, do not want to see the United States tied down in Iraq. • Assumption 10: Iran and Syria are open to constructive political engagement concerning Iraq. Internal Approach • Assumption 11: The Iraqi government will be accepted as legitimate by the majority of Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds. • Assumption 12: The Iraqi government will achieve the ability to govern, sustain, and defend itself without the support of the United States. • Assumption 13: The Iraqi government has the national will and wants political and social reconciliation between the warring elements in Iraq. • Assumption 14: The Iraqi government will accept responsibility for the security environment necessary to internal reconciliation. • Assumption 15: The Iraqi government can provide its people with basic governance and services, particularly utilities, health care, legal, education, and employment. • Assumption 16: The Iraqi military and police security forces will be capable of maintaining stability within the country. • Assumption 17: The United States Congress will appropriate the necessary funds to the long-term reconstruction of Iraq. • Assumption 18: The Iraqi government will maintain and operate reconstruction projects launched by the United States. • Assumption 19: The oil sector of the Iraqi economy will be restored to profitability. • Assumption 20: The Iraqi government believes the United States will carry out its plans even if the Iraqi government does not accept or implement planned changes. These assumptions meet the second criterion for planning assumptions – they are necessary to the successful implementation of the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group Report. It remains uncertain that they meet the first criterion for planning assumptions – that they are valid. If proven to not be true they place any implementation of the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group Report in jeopardy. In the latter case, the potential 2nd and 3rd order magnitude effects will carry over to the larger war on terror and the global standing of the United States. An Iraq in chaos offers a haven for terrorism to grow regionally and globally. Terrorist attacks could increase both domestically and worldwide. Externally, the attention of the United States could be diverted at a time when it faces demanding issues in Afghanistan, Korea, Iran, and long-term in the Pacific theater. Internally, even at a time when it confronts homeland security challenges the November, 2006, elections were largely viewed as a referendum on United States progress in Iraq. Failure to maintain public support will weaken not only United States foreign policy, but domestic homeland security efforts. In short, success in Iraq is vital to United States interests. There has been enough time for debate. It’s time now for effective action to be taken by converting the assumptions above into facts. (1) The Iraq Study Group Report, First Edition (New York: Vintage Books, 2006). http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps76748/iraq_study_group_report.pdf (Access 12/20/06) (2) Anthony Cordesman, “The Baker-Hamilton Study Group Report: The Elephant Gives Birth to a Mouse,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 6, 2006. http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061206_cordesman_commentary.pdf (Accessed 12/20/06) (3) Martin Kaplan, “Does Iraq Need More Debate?,” Los Angeles Times (December 19, 2006). (4) Zbigniew Brzezinski, “There is much more at stake for America than Iraq,” The Financial Times (December 19, 2006). (5) Staff Organization And Operations, Headquarters, Department of The Army, 1997, 5-7. ]]> tag:www.thestrategist.org,2006://1.48 2006-12-04T19:48:33Z 2006-12-04T20:01:06Z

Two days prior to his resignation Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld sent the White House a memo suggesting new options for Iraq. Here are a few key points from the Rumsfeld memo, with a critique for each: Rumsfeld Memo: “Clearly, what...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org Rumsfeld Memo: “Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough.” • This is a clear admission that the administration's current military-only strategy has not worked. Rumsfeld's memo misses the point that the problems posed by insurgencies are political rather than military in nature. • Hammes’ point: Insurgencies are still based on Mao Zedong's fundamental precept that superior political will, properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power.]]> Rumsfeld Memo: “Publicly announce a set of benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi Government and the U.S. — political, economic and security goals — to chart a path ahead for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people (to get them moving) and for the U.S. public (to reassure them that progress can and is being made).” • Rumsfeld’s memo acknowledges the necessity of maintaining public and political will, i.e. the national will, to continue the war. However, it does not provide details on what the new benchmarks would be. Rumsfeld Memo: “Aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the success of the ISF — the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Planning, Health, Criminal Justice, Prisons, etc. — by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve/National Guard volunteers (i.e., give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it.)” • Despite suggesting benchmarks above for political, economic, and security goals, here Rumsfeld’s memo suggests cutting the other USG departments out of the political process, in favor of a go-it-alone approach by DOD. This goes completely against other strategies for winning the war on terror, to include the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission to engage all the elements of national power. • Hammes’ point: Learning to adjust is the key to success in counterinsurgency. Conventional military weakness forces insurgents to be adaptable, so defeating them requires coherent, patient action -- encompassing a range of political, economic, social and military activities -- that can be executed only by a team drawn from all parts of government. You don't outfight the insurgent. You outgovern him. Rumsfeld memo: Among the less attractive options - Try a Dayton-like process. • Rumsfeld’s memo is suggesting that a diplomatic approach to bring the warring parties together to bring an end to the sectarian violence should not be used. This would require brokering negotiations between the Shiites, Sunnis, and the Kurds, and possible Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. • The Dayton Accords for peace in Boznia and Herzegovina were conducted at a secure site in a bid to curb the participants' ability to negotiate in the media rather than at the bargaining table. In a far-from-subtle hint of the consequences should agreement not be reached, early in the talks a dinner for the participants was held in a hangar at the nearby U.S. Air Force Museum. The final agreement mandated a wide range of international organizations to monitor, oversee, and implement components of the agreement. (See Wikipedia) Other key points from the Hammes’ article: • Counterinsurgency is a very different animal. Insurgents practice the art of destruction, which is easy; counterinsurgents have the far more difficult task of creating a functioning government. • Journal articles offer another rich vein of enlightenment on the conduct of counterinsurgency. In "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency" in the May-June 2005 issue of Military Review, Kalev I. Sepp, a former Special Forces officer and now a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, studied 51 recent counterinsurgencies to develop a list of 12 "best practices" common to all successful ones, and nine "worst practices" of the unsuccessful ones. Sadly, in Iraq, the United States scores below 50 percent on the first and above 50 percent on the second. • In "Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency," in the summer 2006 issue of Parameters, Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, commander of U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan from October 2003 to April 2005, highlights the insurgents' ability to think in terms of 25-year wars. "The Americans may have all the wristwatches," he quotes the Taliban reminding villagers, "but we have all the time." CONCLUSION: The Rumsfeld memo focuses on defeating the insurgency, rather than achieving political and social reconciliation between the warring parties, as the key to U.S. success in Iraq. Our senior leadership continues to miss the point. References: 1. Rumsfeld Memo of Options for Iraq War, 3 December 2006 2. Thomas X. Hammes, Insurgency from Mao to Iraqis, Special to The Washington Post ]]> tag:www.thestrategist.org,2006://1.47 2006-11-13T05:12:28Z 2006-11-14T12:58:54Z

The outcome of the national elections of November 7, 2006 represents a fracturing of the American national will concerning the war in Iraq. To understand it is to see how a number of elements have converged: • First, the insurgency...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org The outcome of the national elections of November 7, 2006 represents a fracturing of the American national will concerning the war in Iraq. To understand it is to see how a number of elements have converged: • First, the insurgency in Iraq, as well as the insurgency in Afghanistan, and the worldwide insurgency of al Qaeda, are political struggles, and not military struggles. They are also otherwise known as fourth generation warfare. As such, their (the insurgents') strategic objective is to defeat the national will of the counterinsurgent (the United States). • The national will of the United States consists of two elements: The political will of the government, and the public will as reflected in popular support. When the national will - whether the political component or the popular component - turns against the counterinsurgency effort, the insurgent wins. • In the case of last week's elections the American public used the ballot box to demonstrate the turning of the public will against the war, i.e. the counterinsurgency, in Iraq. This election was more about the failure of American leadership and the absence of grand strategy in the war in Iraq than anything else. By taking control of the Congress and the Senate from the Republican Party and giving it to the Democratic Party, the public demonstrated as clearly as it did during the Vietnam war that it has turned against the war in Iraq. Here are some possible implications: • The United States has come up against insurgencies/fourth generation warfare on three previous occasions - in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. In each case the United States lost as a result of the fracturing of its national will. In Vietnam the American public turned against the war, and in Lebanon and Somalia the national political will faltered. • To lose a war is bad. Each failure resulted in subsequent challenges to American leadership on the international scene. The negative effects of its strategic failure in Vietnam produced a lingering effect on the United States, both in its institutions and the American public, that remains today. The durability of the potential negative effects of strategic failure in the war on terror - in the war in Iraq, the war in Afghanistan, and the war against al Qaeda - can be observed in the current debate in public forums on the perceived threat to the nation. As a nation we must consider this very carefully. In the near future the independent Iraq Study Group will offer its recommendations to the Bush administration. Hopefully, as they seek an exit strategy from Iraq they will find the wisdom of Solomon in their deliberations. tag:www.thestrategist.org,2006://1.46 2006-11-11T14:13:49Z 2006-11-12T04:04:20Z

Last week, on the 2nd of November, the New York Times published a chart from a military briefing that it says indicates that Iraq is sliding into chaos. (1) However, analysis of the chart does not support that conclusion. The...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org New York Times published a chart from a military briefing that it says indicates that Iraq is sliding into chaos. (1) However, analysis of the chart does not support that conclusion. The chart merely purports to demonstrate indications and warnings of civil conflict, and uses a bar to gauge the current level of civil conflict in Iraq on a continuum between peace and chaos. The relative credibility of the New York Times slide notwithstanding, it would be very convenient if we could simply adjust our military's metrics in Iraq, and therefore achieve success. The reality, however, is not that easy. The strategic mistakes in Iraq are so egregious that it is sometimes difficult to know where to begin when discussing them. For example, what has been the effect of our military's success in killing al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, and what does it indicate about the level of civil conflict in Iraq? An answer can be found in the DOD Report to Congress: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (August, 2006). This quarterly report is required by law, and it states: ]]> The death of terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June was a major success for the Coalition and the Government of Iraq, but al-Qaeda in Iraq remains able to conduct operations due to its resilient, semi-autonomous cellular structure of command and control. (2) In effect, the death of Al-Zarqawi has had little to no effect on the Iraqi insurgency because the insurgency has successfully taken on the characteristics of a resilient network. The recently declassified National Intelligence Estimate has an even more dire assessment: United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership of al-Qa’ida and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that al-Qa’ida will continue to pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist organization. We also assess that the global jihadist movement—which includes al-Qa’ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells—is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts. • Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion. • If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide. (3) From this assessment we can conclude that our counterterrorism efforts in the war on terror, and particularly our military operations in Iraq, are either having little to no effect on al Qaeda, or may even be fostering its growth and spread worldwide. Some insight into why this is happening can be found in an article published by retired Marine Corps Colonel Thomas X. Hammes in the July-August 2006 edition of Military Review (published by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS). In Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks Hammes makes the following points: • First and foremost, insurgencies [including the Iraqi insurgency and the al Qaeda global insurgency] are political and not military struggles. They are not amenable to purely military solutions without resorting to levels of brutality unacceptable to the Western world. • Second, the political will of the counterinsurgent's [the United States'] own population is critical. If that population [American public] turns sour when faced with the long time frame and mounting costs of counterinsurgency, the insurgent will win [Now in its sixth year, according to a recent report from the Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessment the total costs of the War on Terror are approaching $1 trillion dollars. (4)] • Insurgencies are measured in decades. The Chinese Communists fought for 27 years; the Vietnamese fought for 30 years; the Palestinians have been fighting since 1968. Even when insurgencies were defeated in Malaysia and El Salvador it took 12 years. [The United States has fought against 3 insurgencies - in Vietnam, in Lebanon, and in Somalia - and was defeated politically each time.] • Finally, our great technological advantage does not provide an advantage in counterinsurgency. In the past the side with the simplest technology has often won. What has been decisive in most counterinsurgencies were the human attributes of leadership, cultural understanding, and political judgment. [The United States has not performed well in these areas in the War on Terror.] (5) Conclusion: The Iraqi and al Qaeda insurgencies represent political problems for the United States; in response we have attempted to apply a military solution. This is a dialectical mismatch to which metrics cannot effectively be applied. The war in Iraq is going to be a long struggle and we are going to have to change our strategic approach to it if we are to be successful - which we must be if we want our nation to avoid strategic failure and the durability of its potential negative effects. Continued miscalculation as we have shown thus far has the potential to be our downfall. (1) Michael R. Gordon, “Military Report Says Iraq Edging Toward Chaos,” New York Times (November 2, 2006). (2) Department of Defense Quarterly Report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 29, 2006. 25. (3) Director of National Intelligence, Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States,” April, 2006, 1. (4) Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Five Years Later: Funding For Defense, Military Operations, Homeland Security, And Related Activities Since 9/11, September 7, 2006. 1. (5) Thomas X. Hammes, “Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks,” Military Review (July-August 2006). ]]> tag:www.thestrategist.org,2006://1.45 2006-09-15T12:35:11Z 2006-09-16T03:42:46Z

The proliferation of national strategies, of which there are no fewer than 20 which deal with the problems of homeland security, homeland defense, and every conceivable issue in piecemeal fashion, have resulted in an approach to the War on Terror...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org National Security Strategy of the United States of America and the National Strategy for Homeland Security.]]> National Security Strategy Of The United States Of America pre-dates but broadly parallels the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission of what the United States should do – employ all the elements of national power; and how it should do it – transform the major institutions of American national security to meet the requirements of the post-9/11 era.(1) The 2006 version reinforces the original tenets from 2002 and lists examples of progress made in the past four years. It reserves to the United States the option of preemptive actions to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach. In this sense, it forms a loose overarching strategy to secure the United States against terrorist attack. It defines America’s enemy as terrorism and terrorist networks in general, but it makes the fundamental strategic error espoused by Tilford, in that it does not clearly identify the enemy, nor United States national objectives regarding that enemy.(2) In its language the 2006 National Security Strategy Of The United States Of America may be contributing inadvertently to the motivations of al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, in the War on Terror. It clearly states that, “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture.”(3) In Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, Scheur argues that it is precisely American policies and actions of the past 30 years in Muslim nations, including pressure to conform to democratic principles, that have lead to the War on Terror. American policies and actions “provide Muslims with proof of what bin Laden describes as ‘an ocean of oppression, injustice, slaughter, and plunder carried out by you against our Islamic ummah. It is therefore commanded by our religion that we must fight back. We are defending ourselves against the United States. This is a ‘defensive jihad’ as we want to protect our land and people.’”(4) Scheur supports this argument with public opinion polls in the Muslim world, which indicate an overwhelming negative view of the United States.(5) Whether democracy is a clear and obtainable objective in the War on Terror is questionable. In Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World, Peters takes the position that “Democracy must be earned and learned. It cannot be decreed from without. In a grim paradox, our [United States] insistence on instant democracy in shattered states…is our greatest contribution to global instability.” (6) Efforts to push democracy on other sovereign nations may be perceived by those nations and their cultures as the ultimate example of American hubris. This may be a causal factor that leads members of other cultures to respond to calls of war against the United States. The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Securityalso predates The 9/11 Commission Report.(7) Its stated purpose, “to mobilize and organize the nation to secure the homeland from terrorist attacks,” seems to be a goal that would be more applicable to the National Security Strategy Of The United States Of America.(8) Its objectives – preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and response and recovery to terrorist attacks – are focused inward toward domestic preparations and constitute a primarily defensive and preventive strategy. It is an example of what Summers described as taking the strategic defensive, which led to United States defeat in Vietnam.(9) Much of what it prescribes for homeland security also conforms to Clausewitz’s definition of preparations for war instead of the conduct of war proper. It does not provide an objective or a strategy for offensive actions to counter terrorism, to preempt it away from United States borders, or for taking the strategic offensive in the War on Terror. In its current form it provides a good blueprint for the Department of Homeland Security but, despite having a segment devoted to American Federalism and Homeland Security, it does not provide any authority for directing how the various federal agencies are to work in synchronization with one another to prosecute the War on Terror. Ultimately, in its call for implementation of homeland security measures, costing hundreds of billions of dollars to implement, it may play to al Qaeda’s strategic objective of bleeding the United States economy to defeat American resolve.(10) Paradoxically, al Qaeda’s strategic objective is similar to that employed by the United States when it bled the former United Soviet Socialist Republic into bankruptcy in the Cold War arms race. The nature of the War on Terror - against the unknown, the uncertain, and the unexpected, as Rumsfeld indicated - makes strategic thought difficult.(11) The proliferation of national strategies that partition the War on Terror into segments further complicates the effort. An example of how this occurs can be found in Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War, in which Beyerchen includes a discussion of the manner in which chance is associated with Clausewitz’s concept of the fog of uncertainty in war, which obscures or distorts most of the factors on which action is based.(12) According to Beyerchen, chance as a function of analytical blindness, as described by the late 19th century mathematician Henri Poincaré and displayed in Clausewitz’s work, results in an inability to see the universe as an interconnected whole. To paraphrase Beyerchen’s argument and apply it to the War on Terror: The inability to see the War on Terror in its entirety has resulted in multiple national strategies that break it down into segments that can be more effectively dealt with. Yet it happens that these segments react upon each other and the effects of this interaction then seem to be due to chance. The result is that the effort to comprehend the War on Terror through analysis, the effort to partition off pieces of it to make them individually amenable to strategic thought, opens the possibility of being blindsided by the partitioning process. According to Beyerchen, Clausewitz had a profound sense of how the understanding of phenomena – in this case the War on Terror – is truncated by the bounds placed on it for analytical convenience. Clausewitz stressed the failure of theorists to obtain effective principles because they insist on isolating individual factors or aspects of the problems presented in war. Beyerchen quotes Clausewitz to illustrate his point, Efforts were therefore made to equip the conduct of war with principles, rules, or even systems. This did present a positive goal, but people failed to take an adequate account of the endless complexities involved. As we have seen the conduct of war branches out in all directions and has no definite limits; while any system, any model, has the finite nature of a synthesis….[these attempts] aim at fixed values; but in war everything is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities. They [theorists] direct the inquiry exclusively toward physical quantities, whereas all military action is entwined with psychological forces and effects. They [theorists] consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of continuous interaction of opposites.(13) This is not to indicate that strategy in the War on Terror is without value. Just the opposite is true. While strategy as a plan, or product, is problematic as indicated in the discussion above, strategy as process brings great value. Strategy as process brings together often disparate elements to understand and confront a war that is in many ways at odds with historical reference. The issue for the United States is how it will transform its strategic processes to meet the requirements of the information age. (1) National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed 05/20/06). (2) National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf (accessed 05/20/06). Earl Tilford, “The War on Terror: World War IV,” A Reserve Officers Association National Security Report, Officer (October 2004), 38. (3) National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006, 6. (4) Anonymous (Michael Scheur), Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey’s, Inc., 2004), 129. (5) Ibid, 177. (6) Ralph Peters, Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World (Mechanisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002), 179-181. (7) National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002). (8) National Strategy for Homeland Security, 1. (9) Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1984), Ch. 8. (10) Anonymous (Michael Scheur), Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, 100-101. (11) Donald Rumsfeld, remarks presented on “21st Century Transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces” at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C., January 31, 2002. http://www.oft.osd.mil/library_files/speech_136_rumsfeld_speech_31_jan_2002.pdf (accessed 03/08/06) (12) Alan D. Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security, 17:3 (Winter, 1992), 59-90. (13) Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 134-136. ]]> tag:www.thestrategist.org,2006://1.44 2006-09-09T23:24:12Z 2006-09-16T04:17:06Z

The lesson of Vietnam, a war of policy and limited political objectives, is that on the battlefield the United States military accomplished every tactical objective it set, but in the end North Vietnam, and not the United States, emerged strategically...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org The lesson of Vietnam, a war of policy and limited political objectives, is that on the battlefield the United States military accomplished every tactical objective it set, but in the end North Vietnam, and not the United States, emerged strategically victorious. The success of the United States military in destroying the Viet Cong insurgency did not prevent North Vietnam from attaining its strategic objective of defeating American public support for the war and forcing the United States to withdraw from South Vietnam. In defeating American public support for the Vietnam War North Vietnam was able to fracture the national will of the United States. Can the same thing happen in the War on Terror? In labeling its post-9/11 efforts the “War” on Terror the United States invoked a war metaphor. In so doing it has tied its success or failure to the rules of war, including the national will, which consists of two elements: The political will of the government, and the public will as reflected in popular support. It is a principle of United States history that where there is no national will there can be no war. The same holds true in the War on Terror. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, released by the White House, the executive branch states unambiguously that, “America is at war with a transnational terrorist movement fueled by a radical ideology of hatred, oppression, and murder.” (1) Although this would presume to resolve the issue the legislative and judicial branches of the government are not in accordance with the executive branch. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 Congress passed Public Laws 107-40 and 107-243. These laws give the President broad powers to prosecute the effort that has come to be known popularly as the War on Terror. Under the provisions of Public Law 107-40, the President is authorized to use force against those nations, organizations, or persons who planned and carried out the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and those that harbored them, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.(2) Public Law 107-243 authorizes the President to use the armed forces of the United States to defend the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.(3) However, from a legal perspective these laws are not a formal declaration of war by the legislative branch. In 2004 the United States Supreme Court ruled that War on Terror detainees at Guantanamo Bay can take their cases that they are unlawfully imprisoned to the American court system.(4) The Court further reinforced its position in 2006 when it later ruled against Bush Administration efforts to conduct war crimes trials for some detainees at Guantanamo Bay.(5) The impact of the Court’s rulings are that they call into question whether the United States is legally at war in the War on Terror, or whether it is actually pursuing a law enforcement action. By offering protections of the United States legal system to the detainees, it appears that the judicial branch does not recognize the War on Terror as a war according to legal and historical definitions. Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, gives to Congress – the elected representatives of the American people – the power to declare war. A declaration of war – to establish the national will – therefore becomes a shared responsibility between the political will of the government and the popular will of its constituents. This is more than just a formality. Failure by Congress to declare war in Vietnam led to a failure to mobilize the second element of the national will, the popular will of the United States public, and ultimately contributed to the nation’s defeat. A declaration of war gives the President clear-cut military authority, as well as non-military options, including internment of armed combatants and seizure of foreign funds and assets. A formal declaration of war in the War on Terror may have precluded the Supreme Court’s decision to grant detainees at Guantanamo Bay access to the protections of the United States judicial system. In the War on Terror, the United States is currently expending the bulk of its strategic military efforts against insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, which can be viewed as fronts in the larger War on Terror, and a global insurgency being waged by the al Qaeda terrorist network.(6) In a manner reminiscent of Vietnam, public opinion polls reflect that, while the American public continues to support the overall War on Terror, it has grown increasingly disenchanted with the War in Iraq. American leaders would do well to heed the risk of pursuing a war metaphor in the War on Terror without achieving unity among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, and without maintaining public support. To fracture the national will – its political or its public elements – would invite strategic failure similar to that which occurred in Vietnam. (1) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006. 1. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf (accessed 09/07/06) (2) Congressional Record 147 (2001), September 14. Public Law 107-40, 115 STAT. 224, Authorization For Use of Military Force. (3) Congressional Record 148 (2002), October 10. Public Law 107-243, 116 STAT. 1498, Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. (4) Rasul et al v. Bush, President of the United States, et al., 542 U.S. 03-334 and 03-343 (2004). The majority ruling of the Supreme Court was that United States courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay. As the Supreme Court pointed out, the Guantanamo Bay detainees: are not nationals of countries at war with the United States; deny they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United States; have never been afforded access to any tribunal and therefore have never been tried and convicted of wrongdoing; for more than two years have been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control. (5) Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al., 548 U.S. 05-184 (2006). The majority ruling of the Supreme Court was that it has jurisdiction to hear the case of an accused combatant before his military commission takes place; that the federal government did not have authority to set up these particular special military commissions; and that the special military commissions were illegal under both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Convention of 1949. (6) National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, 2005, 1. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf (accessed 02/09/06) ]]> tag:www.thestrategist.org,2006://1.43 2006-08-25T03:16:23Z 2006-08-27T07:03:46Z

Situation The War on Terror has been called “the first great war between nations and networks.”(1) Five years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 it represents a juncture for the United States that continues to severely test its political and...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org Situation The War on Terror has been called “the first great war between nations and networks.”(1) Five years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 it represents a juncture for the United States that continues to severely test its political and public will, and will set the terms and quality of its future existence. In the post-9/11 era the United States finds itself engaged in three simultaneous ongoing conflicts: in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and against the global insurgency being waged by al Qaeda. At the same time, it must move beyond its traditional industrial age approach to warfare and prepare to engage adversaries both in new forms, as well as in new domains of conflict. In short, it must redefine its strategic canvas. ]]> Premise The premise is that America’s future adversaries, whether they take the form of terrorist or other types of networks, are not invincible. In fact, their structures and operations can be very fragile and are certainly capable of being defeated. However, it is necessary to move away from the inductive Cold War approach of the past 50 years – looking for weaknesses, gaps, and deficiencies, and determining how to exploit them; and toward deductive thinking and an adaptive capabilities-based approach in the War on Terror – a conscious search for the unexpected and the bounds of feasibility.(2) The key tenet of this approach, the new strategic canvas, is that transformation from industrial age methods to information age concepts and methods is essential to long-term success in the War on Terror and beyond. The emergence of al Qaeda as the likely forerunner of terrorist and other types of networks in the information age will drive strategic transformation from industrial age domains of conflict – air, land, maritime, and cyber, to information age domains of conflict – physical, information, cognitive, and social. Traditional concepts of waging warfare against an adversary’s centers of gravity will be replaced with a focus on the elimination of critical systems, nodes, and links of information age networks. Network warfare will replace conventional warfare in the information age as both nation states and non-state entities come to realize its dialectical advantages. The Strategic Canvas The current operational paradigm employed by the United States in the War on Terror evolved from the experience of the United States military during the industrial-scale wars of the twentieth century. It is rooted in industrial age concepts that focus on conventional, symmetrical threats and responses, and hierarchical command and control. It is geography-based across territory and space. Its standard for defending the United States against external threats is a layered defense across the operational domains that comprise the industrial age global commons – the land, air, maritime, cyber, and space domains. This paradigm is based on the concept that an active layered and comprehensive defense is necessary if the United States is to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat threats as early and as far from United States borders as possible; and, if necessary recover from them when they do occur. Its primary weakness is that it presumes that attacks will originate from outside the homeland and be conducted in a conventional manner. It forces acceptance that military force will always be the first line of defense. However, as stated above, the information age will see the end of conventional warfare. The overwhelming battlefield successes of the United States military in the gulf wars (1991, 1993) have initiated the demise of large-scale maneuver warfare by illustrating its limitations. The reaction in many corners of the world is that there are no nations remaining that are capable of sustaining the costs of competing with the United States in conventional warfare.(3) Instead of relying on military force to wage war, strong and weak nations alike will find other ways to wage war, in other domains, by redefining the strategic canvas. Further, this development will not be limited to nation states, but will also be available to non-state entities, as well as super-empowered individuals and groups. The emerging information age paradigm is a network-centric approach based on the premise that a fundamental shift in power has occurred from industry to information. It is rooted in information age concepts that focus on non-conventional, asymmetrical threats and responses, and non-hierarchical command and control. It expands beyond the geographical base of territory and space. Its standard for defending the United States against both internal and external threats is a universal networked defense across the operational domains that comprise the information age global commons – the physical, information, cognitive, and social domains. Network-centric operations seek to create an information advantage and translate it into an operational advantage. It accepts that military force, while essential, may be neither the first nor the most significant line of defense. The information age domains are defined as:(4) • Physical – the traditional domain of warfare where a force is moved through time and space. It includes the land, sea, air, and space realms. • Information – the domain where information is created, manipulated, and shared. It includes the cyber realm. • Cognitive – the domain where intent, strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures reside. It is the domain where decisive concepts and tactics emerge. • Social – the domain which comprises the necessary elements of any human enterprise. It is where humans interact, exchange information, form shared awareness and understandings, and make collaborative decisions. It is also the domain of culture, values, attitudes, and beliefs, and where political decisions are made. The strategic canvas uses business concepts on strategy to demonstrate the transformation of warfare that must occur.(5) In the industrial age, large and small powers compete for the same thing – conventional military supremacy in the physical and cyber domains that comprise the industrial age global commons. Relative advantage or disadvantage is a matter of availability of the greatest amount of resources and control of the available knowledge. Al Qaeda, as a forerunner of terrorist groups and non-state entities in the information age, rejects the logic of trying to compete with conventional military forces. As a non-state entity it lacks the necessary resources to employ conventional warfare in order to achieve its strategic objectives. Instead, it seeks to redefine its strategic canvas and to make conventional warfare irrelevant by embracing an information age paradigm for warfare. It seeks to leverage the shift in power from industry to information. In so doing, it tries to avoid conventional warfare in the physical and cyber domains of the industrial age global commons – but seeks instead to transfer the conflict to the domains of the information age global commons where it can compete by employing its asymmetrical strengths to its advantage. The implication of the strategic canvas is that all, greater and lesser powers, including nation states and non-state entities alike, will be able to acquire infinite capabilities and compete equally in the information age domains. However, numerical scale can still play a decisive role in achieving and maintaining the strategic advantage. The United States can retain significant advantage by adopting a strategic approach similar to that of al Qaeda and other potential adversaries. This will allow it to bring to bear all the elements of its national power, and continue to take advantage of its superior resources and knowledge to develop strategies to defeat entities such as al Qaeda. The War on Terror, and that which follows, will be won or lost in the domains of the information age global commons. (1) John Arquilla, Professor of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School. Student notes from a lecture given on networks and netwar at the Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, to graduate students in Cohorts 403 and 404, on July 12, 2005. (2) Arthur Cebrowski, “Transformation and the Changing Character of War,” Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, Transformation Trends (June 17, 2004), 2. (3) Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America (Panama City, Panama: Pan American Publishing Company, 2002), xix. (4) Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (2005), 20. (5) W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation, 2005), 25. ]]> tag:www.thestrategist.org,2006://1.42 2006-07-31T01:11:39Z 2006-08-25T03:15:33Z

Current news headlines are replete with stories on the apparently deteriorating security situation in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad. After nearly three and a half years of war, time in which the United States has had the opportunity to carry out...

Facilitator www.thestrtegist.org On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, by the late Colonel (Ret.) Harry G. Summers, Jr. In the opening pages of his analysis Summers asks the question, "How could we have succeeded so well [tactically], yet failed so miserably [strategically]?" Indeed, on balance it appears difficult to grasp how a Western industrialized superpower could be defeated by an underdeveloped agrarian nation with a fraction of its population and no gross national product to speak of, without accepting that the stronger nation's overall objectives and strategy in the war were flawed. The lesson of Vietnam is that, on the battlefield the United States accomplished every military objective it set, but in the end North Vietnam, and not the United States, emerged victorious. The question we have to ask ourselves today is whether Summers' question is relevant to Iraq.]]> Los Angeles Times, ?Crackdown Yields Little Security In Baghdad,? July 21, 2006. (2) Miami Herald, ?Disillusioned With The War? Here's Why ,? July 30, 2006. (3) New York Times, ?The Peculiar Disappearance Of The War In Iraq,? July 30, 2006.]]>