http://www.thestrategist.org/ en Copyright 2008 Sat, 12 Jan 2008 19:33:22 -0700 http://www.sixapart.com/movabletype/ http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss National Security Strategy of the United States of America and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. ]]> http://www.thestrategist.org/2008/01/issues_of_strategy_in_the_war.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2008/01/issues_of_strategy_in_the_war.html Sat, 12 Jan 2008 19:33:22 -0700 On War. (1) Despite being published posthumously after Clausewitz’s death in 1831, On War continues to shape current American military thinking and remains the most modern authority available on the essence of war. Simply put, no one has produced a better description of the essence of war and the immutable principles for its conduct in nearly two centuries. It is considered by many to be the greatest work on war and strategy ever produced by Western civilization, and its key concepts can be used to put current efforts in the War on Terror in perspective.]]> http://www.thestrategist.org/2007/12/issues_of_doctrine_in_the_war.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2007/12/issues_of_doctrine_in_the_war.html Sat, 22 Dec 2007 19:39:46 -0700 9/11 Commission Report indicate that the United States is in popular deed, if not in legal fact, a nation at war, and lead to the Commission’s recommendations for establishing national objectives and a national strategy for conducting the war on terror. (1) The findings of the 9/11 Commission meet two of the three critical elements in Clausewitz’s military-political definition of war. First, that the effort is directed toward an identified opponent and, second, that it involves violence or use of force to compel our opponent to fulfill our will. According to the 9/11 Commission the United States’ opponent in the war on terror consists of the terrorist groups and their allies, particularly the global al Qaeda network, that form the threat of Islamist terrorism, thereby satisfying the first element of war: an effort directed at an identified opponent. (2) Although there are problems with this definition, particularly that it falls short of defining the full scope of the threat to the United States, it represents a start in developing a national objective and strategy. The use of American and allied forces to find and destroy terrorist groups, most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq, partially fulfills the second element of war: the use of violence or force to compel our opponent to meet our will. (3) The issue to be resolved is whether the insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Iraq are the right enemy, at the right time, and in the right place.]]> http://www.thestrategist.org/2007/11/issues_of_policy_in_the_war_on.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2007/11/issues_of_policy_in_the_war_on.html Fri, 02 Nov 2007 07:10:24 -0700 The lack of definition in the war on terror is problematic. While it allows national leaders the flexibility to define and redefine success in ways that suit political purposes, it also has potential drawbacks. From an operational perspective, it potentially leads to lack of clarity and understanding, and thus lack of focused national effort along with its attendant risk of failure. The very phrase “war on terror” lacks definition, and therefore presents the United States with a strategic issue that inhibits its efforts to prosecute the war effectively. As multiple sources have indicated, “terror” is not the enemy. In the “war” on terror, neither terror nor terrorism can be defeated since terror is a method and terrorism is a tactic. From this perspective, neither terror nor terrorism takes on the characteristics of entities that can be defeated in the traditional sense. http://www.thestrategist.org/2007/10/issues_of_definition_in_the_wa.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2007/10/issues_of_definition_in_the_wa.html Mon, 08 Oct 2007 10:09:22 -0700 As the United States enters its seventh year in the War on Terror its spending in the total effort is approaching a trillion dollars and its military and civilian casualties combined are approaching 40,000 people. These sacrifices, and more, may be the price for the post-9/11 security of the nation. However, they are significant and they do justify an accounting by American leaders. Three questions can be raised: • Are we winning the War on Terror? • Is the War in Iraq making us safer? • Do our elected leaders understand the strategic situation the nation faces? http://www.thestrategist.org/2007/10/are_we_winning_the_war_on_terr.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2007/10/are_we_winning_the_war_on_terr.html Sun, 07 Oct 2007 20:01:27 -0700 Premise We have to ask ourselves, in the post-modern era of war that is characterized by the information age, if we – the United States – are capable of waging the type of asymmetrical warfare necessary to achieve success in the War on Terror. Specifically: 1. As a great power nation state can we successfully wage asymmetrical warfare? 2. As a liberal western democracy can we maintain the national will necessary to define and achieve success in the War on Terror? ]]> http://www.thestrategist.org/2007/06/are_we_capable_of_waging_the_w.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2007/06/are_we_capable_of_waging_the_w.html Mon, 11 Jun 2007 20:35:48 -0700 Fiasco, author Thomas E. Ricks revives the phrase “lions led by donkeys” to describe his view of the poor leadership of American soldiers in Iraq during the winter of 2003-4. He borrows the popular use of the phrase from German generals who used it to describe the British army in World War I, when British soldiers were led by their generals into battles that became mass slaughters. In referring to them as “lions led by donkeys” Ricks finds little to fault the front line American soldiers in Iraq but much to criticize about their senior military and civilian leaders. He quotes one un-named general who describes Iraq in the winter of 2003-4 as, “Tactically we were fine. Operationally, we were usually okay. Strategically – we were a basket case.” (1) The Current Situation After more than four years of fighting the United States may be on the verge of finding out if its military effort in Iraq remains vulnerable to being characterized as “lions led by donkeys.” On January 10, 2007, President Bush unveiled his administration’s latest strategy for the war in Iraq. The announcement represents both a concession that United States strategy up to now in Iraq has not brought success, as well as acknowledgement that the administration has lost the support of the American public for the war. Key elements of the strategy include the deployment of an additional 20,000 (+) American troops to Baghdad to establish security; new diplomatic initiatives with Iraq’s regional neighbors; doubling the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq; and a set of benchmarks for the Iraqi Government to achieve prior to the beginning of American withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2007.(2) ]]> http://www.thestrategist.org/2007/01/lions_led_by_donkeys.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2007/01/lions_led_by_donkeys.html Sun, 28 Jan 2007 14:32:38 -0700 “Our country deserves a debate that prizes substance over rhetoric…” The resulting fire storm of debate was, in fact, immediate, ranging from the positive to the negative, depending on the political persuasion of the analysts and commentators. Political conservatives denigrated the report as defeatist, while liberals used the report as evidence of the failure of the Bush Administration to effectively prosecute the war in Iraq. Depending on which think tank analysis of the report is believed, it (the report) either goes too far, or it doesn’t go far enough in its recommendation for a new approach to the war. One analysis characterizes the report as “a triumph of hope over experience.”(2) Common phrases that have been bandied about in the media analysis of the report run the gamut from “cut and run” or “stay the course” to the Pentagon’s announced alternatives of “go big,” “go long,” or “go home.” Regardless of political persuasion one theme runs consistently throughout the debate – that of near-unanimous rejection of the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group.]]> http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/12/the_iraq_study_group_report_a.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/12/the_iraq_study_group_report_a.html Thu, 21 Dec 2006 09:03:06 -0700 Rumsfeld Memo: “Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough.” • This is a clear admission that the administration's current military-only strategy has not worked. Rumsfeld's memo misses the point that the problems posed by insurgencies are political rather than military in nature. • Hammes’ point: Insurgencies are still based on Mao Zedong's fundamental precept that superior political will, properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power.]]> http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/12/missing_the_point_in_our_iraq.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/12/missing_the_point_in_our_iraq.html Mon, 04 Dec 2006 12:48:33 -0700 The outcome of the national elections of November 7, 2006 represents a fracturing of the American national will concerning the war in Iraq. To understand it is to see how a number of elements have converged: • First, the insurgency in Iraq, as well as the insurgency in Afghanistan, and the worldwide insurgency of al Qaeda, are political struggles, and not military struggles. They are also otherwise known as fourth generation warfare. As such, their (the insurgents') strategic objective is to defeat the national will of the counterinsurgent (the United States). • The national will of the United States consists of two elements: The political will of the government, and the public will as reflected in popular support. When the national will - whether the political component or the popular component - turns against the counterinsurgency effort, the insurgent wins. • In the case of last week's elections the American public used the ballot box to demonstrate the turning of the public will against the war, i.e. the counterinsurgency, in Iraq. This election was more about the failure of American leadership and the absence of grand strategy in the war in Iraq than anything else. By taking control of the Congress and the Senate from the Republican Party and giving it to the Democratic Party, the public demonstrated as clearly as it did during the Vietnam war that it has turned against the war in Iraq. http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/11/the_fracturing_of_the_national.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/11/the_fracturing_of_the_national.html Sun, 12 Nov 2006 22:12:28 -0700 New York Times published a chart from a military briefing that it says indicates that Iraq is sliding into chaos. (1) However, analysis of the chart does not support that conclusion. The chart merely purports to demonstrate indications and warnings of civil conflict, and uses a bar to gauge the current level of civil conflict in Iraq on a continuum between peace and chaos. The relative credibility of the New York Times slide notwithstanding, it would be very convenient if we could simply adjust our military's metrics in Iraq, and therefore achieve success. The reality, however, is not that easy. The strategic mistakes in Iraq are so egregious that it is sometimes difficult to know where to begin when discussing them. For example, what has been the effect of our military's success in killing al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, and what does it indicate about the level of civil conflict in Iraq? An answer can be found in the DOD Report to Congress: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (August, 2006). This quarterly report is required by law, and it states: ]]> http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/11/is_iraq_sliding_into_chaos.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/11/is_iraq_sliding_into_chaos.html Sat, 11 Nov 2006 07:13:49 -0700 National Security Strategy of the United States of America and the National Strategy for Homeland Security.]]> http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/09/national_strategies_and_our_in.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/09/national_strategies_and_our_in.html Fri, 15 Sep 2006 05:35:11 -0700 The lesson of Vietnam, a war of policy and limited political objectives, is that on the battlefield the United States military accomplished every tactical objective it set, but in the end North Vietnam, and not the United States, emerged strategically victorious. The success of the United States military in destroying the Viet Cong insurgency did not prevent North Vietnam from attaining its strategic objective of defeating American public support for the war and forcing the United States to withdraw from South Vietnam. In defeating American public support for the Vietnam War North Vietnam was able to fracture the national will of the United States. Can the same thing happen in the War on Terror? In labeling its post-9/11 efforts the “War” on Terror the United States invoked a war metaphor. In so doing it has tied its success or failure to the rules of war, including the national will, which consists of two elements: The political will of the government, and the public will as reflected in popular support. It is a principle of United States history that where there is no national will there can be no war. The same holds true in the War on Terror. http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/09/a_fractured_national_will.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/09/a_fractured_national_will.html Sat, 09 Sep 2006 16:24:12 -0700 Situation The War on Terror has been called “the first great war between nations and networks.”(1) Five years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 it represents a juncture for the United States that continues to severely test its political and public will, and will set the terms and quality of its future existence. In the post-9/11 era the United States finds itself engaged in three simultaneous ongoing conflicts: in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and against the global insurgency being waged by al Qaeda. At the same time, it must move beyond its traditional industrial age approach to warfare and prepare to engage adversaries both in new forms, as well as in new domains of conflict. In short, it must redefine its strategic canvas. ]]> http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/08/five_years_after_911_the_new_s.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/08/five_years_after_911_the_new_s.html Thu, 24 Aug 2006 20:16:23 -0700 On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, by the late Colonel (Ret.) Harry G. Summers, Jr. In the opening pages of his analysis Summers asks the question, "How could we have succeeded so well [tactically], yet failed so miserably [strategically]?" Indeed, on balance it appears difficult to grasp how a Western industrialized superpower could be defeated by an underdeveloped agrarian nation with a fraction of its population and no gross national product to speak of, without accepting that the stronger nation's overall objectives and strategy in the war were flawed. The lesson of Vietnam is that, on the battlefield the United States accomplished every military objective it set, but in the end North Vietnam, and not the United States, emerged victorious. The question we have to ask ourselves today is whether Summers' question is relevant to Iraq.]]> http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/07/iraq_at_the_tipping_point_or_o.html http://www.thestrategist.org/2006/07/iraq_at_the_tipping_point_or_o.html Sun, 30 Jul 2006 18:11:39 -0700